

BACKGROUND PAPER

ON

ASAT DECISION EXTRACTS

PURPOSE: To provide information to Major General Messer for the Air Staff Council meeting on 21 Feb 80.

BACKGROUND:

--- ADCOM IOC 10-74, Space Defense System, was validated for system development in May 1975. From then until 1978, the Air Force was developing ASAT technology.

--- The 20 Jan 78 SECDEF memo on ASAT policy supported the President's preferred approach of negotiating a verifiable ban with the Soviets, but also directed a vigorous ASAT development program.

--- OSD/Policy was charged with providing the operational requirements. b1

--- USDR&E was directed to implement a balanced and comprehensive ASAT program, organized and budgeted to achieve a full operational capability.

--- The 13 March 78 USDR&E memorandum implemented SECDEF direction by calling for a program directed toward an operational capability. b1

--- The 1 May 1978 JCS memorandum specified an interim ASAT requirement. A 1983 IOC was suggested. b1

--- The 19 Jun 79 DMD directed the following with regard to ASAT:

--- Continuous development of an air launched operational miniature system.

--- Flight test WLF F762.

--- LOC WLF 30 Sep 83.

--- System generated and maintained by Air Force resources,

--- IOC WLF FY 85.

--- Based on the above, the direction to build and deploy an operational system seems clear. The SPC Director believes his direction is ambiguous.

DISCUSSION:

--- In the briefing to the Air Staff Board on 15 Feb, the premises that the direction is unclear was questioned. It was suggested that additional data to support the "unclear direction" statement be available for the Air Force Council. Other points from the Board meeting:

--- The Board wanted the number of options reduced.

--- The Board wanted Col Randolph to lean more toward an operational system vs prototype and contractor dependence.

--- The increased development costs to pursue the more operational system were troubling.

--- Examine costs in more detail to find savings.

--- Consider not buying SPARS to replace units taken from SAC inventory.

--- Suggested that the briefing to the Council be structured to get their endorsement of concept of building a "normal weapon system."

--- The briefing to the Air Force Council is part of the process of developing an agreed Air Force position for the upcoming AFMARC and DSARC reviews.

--- The briefing contains a discussion of the surveillance and C elements of space defense. No decisions are being solicited on these elements at this time. The discussions are generally consistent with the ADC view of capabilities and requirements.

Options are to be presented. As we move forward, they will have the following features:

Option 1 will continue a "prototype" development through limited flight test (10 tests prior to production decision, AFTEC rate limited), will have a short deficiency correction phase after flight test, and will field a highly contractor dependent weapon system.

--- No technical orders (other than F-15 pilot data).

--- No weapon or maintenance simulators (other than modification of F-15 trainer).

--- Limited maintainability/reliability demonstrations.

--- Full contractor maintenance/critical dependence for operation on one contractor.

--- IOC in FY 87.

Option 2 will more closely approximate a "normal" weapon system development. Specifically, it will have a larger flight test program (13 flights, full AFTEC involvement), will have a full scale development phase after flight test, and will field a normally supported weapon system.

--- Full "blue suit" maintenance at base level/normal technical order development.

--- Improved reliability/maintainability.

--- Program Management Responsibility Transfer to AFIC at/near IOC.

This option has the following shortcomings:

--- IOC slips from 87 to 88 (versus 84 in original RFP).

--- Cost in FY 82 increases about \$38M versus first option.

--- A few additional points should be made about these options.

--- Neither option retains \$5 IOC (the cost and degree of concurrency are acceptable for that date.)

--- The second option is expected to result in the lowest life cycle costs (but we haven't seen the SPO numbers yet).

Option 1 is a blueprint for resource management headaches from the TAC perspective, but should give COMCDB a viable ICS (if civilian maintenance and operation is considered acceptable for a combat weapon system).

CONCLUSION:

Based on the above data, it appears that the second option represents a better operational compromise (normal maintenance and operation at a cost of one year IOC slip and added development funds) and should show the lowest total life cycle costs.

The first option should be avoided because

Not in consonance with Air Force policy on military maintenance (intermediate and organizational) for combat weapon systems (AFM 16-1).

Resource management problems

- Single contractor dependence.
- Limited maintainability/reliability design features.
- Training hampered by lack of simulators (other than F-15 trainer mod).
- AFSC managed indefinitely.
- Life cycle costs probably higher.

If a compromise is necessary between these options, one could consider

All "blue suit" flight line operation (weapon loading, checkout, targetting data insertion) with contractors in maintenance facility.

Continued management (versus AFSC).

Not replacing SAC SEAN assets.

On the question of how urgent the need is, and the impact of a one year delay

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The 85 IOC date in the Consolidated Guidance has been dropped.

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ACTION OFFICER: Waj Verbruggen/AFOS/1974 DATE: _____

AUTHENTICATION: _____ DATE: _____